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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, summary judgment has been used as a tool to resolve 
questions of law.  Summary judgment was initially a disfavored judicial 
procedure.  However, as docket caseloads have substantially increased in 
recent years, courts have frequently turned to summary judgment as an 
efficient and just adjudication mechanism.  This article proposes to 
dramatically expand the role of summary judgment in bench trial cases 
where the record is sufficiently complete to allow judges to draw their 
own inferences and to resolve factual disputes. 
Although summary judgment is a useful device, many judges have 
intentionally constrained its effectiveness in federal courts in an effort to 
preserve litigants’ rights to a jury trial.  However, not every dispute is 
destined for a jury trial.  Many cases, either because of the nature of the 
claims involved or as a result of the choice of the litigants, are decided 
solely by a judge.  For example, in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims there are no jury trials and the judge is always the ultimate fact 
finder. 
Unfortunately, however, neither Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure nor, generally, the caselaw that has addressed it, has 
distinguished between bench trial cases and jury trial cases.  At the same 
time, a number of circuits have begun to expand the scope of summary 
judgment in cases where the judge serves as the ultimate fact finder.  
This Article discusses the influence that concern for ensuring a litigant’s 
right to jury trial has had on the crafting and interpretation of the 
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summary judgment rule.  It also suggests that the greater role afforded 
by a number of circuits to judges at summary judgment in bench trial 
cases should be adopted by all courts.  Specifically, this Article argues 
that in bench trial cases, where the record is sufficiently developed, 
judges should have the ability to draw their own inferences in reaching 
both factual and legal determinations.  Furthermore, this Article 
recommends that judges should be able to decide factual disputes at 
summary judgment in bench cases where the record is sufficiently 
complete. 
Indeed, this Article proposes that most bench trial cases can be 
resolved at summary judgment except when factual disputes turn on 
credibility of testimony.  Even when a party demonstrates that further 
material evidence is yet to be discovered, a summary judgment motion 
need not be dismissed; rather, it can be stayed pending further discovery.  
The Article reviews the decisions of a number of circuits affording 
judges broader use of summary judgment during bench trials as evidence 
that the law and federal rules can already accommodate this expanded 
use of summary judgment.  As an alternative, the Article suggests that 
trial courts make more frequent use of Rule 52 “trials on the paper.” 
II.  OVERVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment may be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1  
 1. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in its entirety as follows: 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment 
   (a)  For Claimant.  A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or 
any part thereof. 
  (b) For Defending Party.  A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the 
party’s favor as to all or any part thereof. 
   (c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.  The motion shall be served at least 10 
days before the time fixed for the hearing.  The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits.  The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 




An important mission of the summary judgment procedure is “to assess 
the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”2  In 
other words, trial is indicated only where the case turns on the resolution 
of disputed facts.  The Supreme Court has made clear that only factual 
disputes relating to matters of consequence preclude summary judgment 
proceedings: “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of 
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of 
summary judgment.”3  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has said “only 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.  A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
   (d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion.  If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.  It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just.  Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
 (e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.  Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith.  The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits.  When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  If the adverse party does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse 
party. 
  (f) When Affidavits are Unavailable.  Should it appear from the affidavits of 
a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
  (g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith.  Should it appear to the satisfaction of the  
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other 
party to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note. 
 3. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
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material factual disputes preclude summary judgment; factual disputes 
about immaterial items are irrelevant.”4  The Supreme Court has also 
stressed that summary adjudication rather than trial is often the best 
avenue even in complex cases: “Summary judgment procedure is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as 
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”5  
The purpose of summary judgment is “‘to pierce the pleadings and to 
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for a 
trial.’”6
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court 
must first identify material factual disputes.  Traditionally, in doing so, 
all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought.7  Historically, when there are material 
factual disputes, summary judgment is inappropriate.  When there are no 
material factual disputes, the court proceeds to search the undisputed 
facts in an effort to determine whether the moving party has shown that 
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.8
In other words, when the moving party would bear the burden of 
persuasion at trial, it must first show that there is no genuine dispute as 
to the material facts, and then it must satisfy the burden it would have at 
trial.  To do this, it must show that it would be entitled to a directed 
verdict at trial.9  As the Supreme Court instructed, 
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, 
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.10
Here again, the nonmoving party has traditionally enjoyed the benefit of 
all inferences. 
 4. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 5. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 6. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note). 
 7. See Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987).  But see 
Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that 
a court need not credit “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 
speculation”). 
 8. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 322; see also Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). 




When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it 
must show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the 
nonmoving party’s case.”11  In other words, when the moving party does 
not bear the burden of persuasion, it must establish that no reasonable 
judge or jury could find that the nonmovant had established the requisite 
elements of its claim.  If the moving party has not met its respective 
summary judgment standard, the motion should be denied.  However, 
where the moving party has met its initial burden of proof, the burden 
shifts to the nonmoving party to show that some triable issue, whether 
factual or legal, remains unresolved.  Again, the nonmoving party has 
traditionally enjoyed the benefit of all inferences drawn in its favor.  If it 
succeeds, the motion must be denied; if it does not, the motion will be 
granted. 
But what happens in a nonjury case when the parties have presented 
all the relevant evidence prior to the summary judgment stage?  If the 
facts are in dispute, can the judge at summary judgment weigh the 
evidence and make determinations?  What if the parties have different, 
but legitimate, interpretations of what facts mean; can a judge draw his 
or her own inferences?  In a nonjury trial, after all the evidence is in, it 
would seem expedient and just for judges to draw their own inferences 
and resolve the facts at summary judgment instead of requiring the 
parties to resubmit exactly the same evidence for the judges’ review at 
another proceeding labeled “trial.”  While some courts have begun to 
recognize the wisdom of such adjudication, most are still influenced by a 
concern for a litigant’s right to jury trial, even though such concern is of 
course inapplicable in nonjury cases. 
III.  THE INFLUENCE OF JURY TRIALS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULES 
This Article’s proposals would not radically depart from the historical 
use of summary judgment, but rather represent the next evolutionary 
step.  Initially, summary judgment was viewed negatively because of 
concern that it interfered with or deprived litigants of a jury trial.  
Although summary judgment began as a disfavored legal procedure, 
over the years it became not only an accepted practice, but a favored 
process for efficient, expedient, and just case resolution.  The next steps 
for application of summary judgment, as proposed by this Article, should 
further maximize the rule’s use by acknowledging that certain historical 
limitations of the rule are not appropriate in bench trial cases. 
 11. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 
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The federal rule governing summary judgment was crafted with great 
concern to avoid depriving parties of jury trials.12  This resulted from 
apprehension that state courts were unconstitutionally depriving litigants 
of their right to a jury trial through their use of summary judgment.13  
While summary judgment was not found unconstitutional, this question 
affected the creation of the federal summary judgment rule resulting in 
its drafting as a hesitant remedy to be used cautiously.14
Summary judgment mechanisms based on English law were enacted 
in several states in the 1800s.15  Courts approached these statutes with 
reluctance, viewing summary judgment as a drastic remedy to be used 
sparingly.16  This reluctance began to give way when, in 1929, Professor 
Clark, later a Second Circuit judge, along with Mr. Samenow, published 
a seminal article advocating the use of summary judgment to address the 
excessive delay and congestion then existing in the courts.17  Judge Clark 
was subsequently the primary author of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which were adopted in 1938 and incorporated Rule 56, a 
more advanced version of summary judgment than previously in 
common use.18  Nonetheless, courts by-and-large remained hesitant to 
use summary judgment.19
This reluctance stems from concern over accidentally denying the 
nonmoving party a full trial where there is an issue of fact.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated this sentiment as 
follows: 
 12. Poller v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Sartor v. Ark. 
Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944); Walsh v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 90 F. 
Supp. 322, 328 (N.D. Ill. 1949). 
 13. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902); Gen. 
Inv. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 139 N.E. 216, 219-20 (N.Y. 1923). 
 14. William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment 
Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 
441, 446 (1992); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 10A 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2714, at 247-50 (3d ed. 1998). 
 15. See generally Robert Wyness Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary 
Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193 (1929) (detailing the history and application of 
summary judgment in the American colonies). 
 16. Schwarzer et al., supra note 14, at 446. 
 17. Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE 
L.J. 423 (1929). 
 18. Schwarzer et al., supra note 14, at 447. 
 19. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940) (cautioning 
against using summary judgment as a “catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants 
into its toils and deprive them of a trial”). 




[V]aluable as [summary judgment] is for striking through sham claims and 
defences which stand in the way of a direct approach to the truth of a case, [it] 
was not intended to, it cannot deprive a litigant of, or at all encroach upon, his 
right to a jury trial.  Judges in giving its flexible provisions effect must do so 
with this essential limitation constantly in mind.20
This sentiment was echoed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit: 
The trial court was vested with no discretion.  The federal Constitution gives a 
right of jury trial in a contested issue in a law action.  This right is positive and 
should not be whittled away by decision of contested issues by the judge at 
hearings in camera before trial.21
Concern for how a jury might perceive evidence was perhaps best 
articulated in a decision by a federal district court in New York: “Since 
we are dealing with a procedure that operates in the shadow of the 
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury, if there is any doubt as 
to the existence of a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment cannot be 
granted.”22
The reluctance to use summary judgment lasted in large part for 
almost fifty years until in 1986 the Supreme Court decided a trio of 
cases advocating a broadened use of summary judgment: Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett,23 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,24 and Matsushita Electric 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.25
Despite the Supreme Court decisions, courts have adhered to ingrained 
resistance against the use of summary judgment.  Indeed, the concern for 
preserving a litigant’s right to a jury trial has become so entrenched in 
the interpretation of the summary judgment rule that courts reflexively 
adhere to it as a boilerplate principle even in nonjury cases.26
 20. Id. at 306. 
 21. Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661, 669 (9th Cir. 1955) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 22. Elliott v. Elliot, 49 F.R.D. 283, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 23. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 24. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 25. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 26. Brown v. United States, No. 99-5082, 1999 WL 1021054, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 
5, 1999); Am. Broad. Cos. v. United States, 129 F.3d 1243, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“On 
appeal [from the Court of Federal Claims], we review a grant of summary judgment . . . 
de novo, with justifiable inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving party.”); Lane 
Bryant, Inc. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Upon review of a 
grant of summary judgment [by the Court of Federal Claims], all evidence is to be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.  Summary judgment is properly granted 
when no material facts are in dispute and the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law.”); Chem. Separation Tech., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 513, 516 
(1999) (“[A]ll facts must be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and all inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion.”); Gutz v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 291, 295-96 (1999), 
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Still, a number of circuits have begun to realize the inapplicability of 
this concern to bench trial cases and the inefficiency it has generated.  
However, more courts should be educated on this point, and the judge’s 
role in summary judgment accordingly expanded. 
IV.  EXPANDING THE ROLE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates a broad 
use of summary judgment.  The use of Rule 56 should be expanded to 
allow for the efficient drawing of inferences and resolution of factual 
disputes in nonjury cases.  This expansion should be done both to 
determine if a trial is necessary and to interpret the facts.  Not every case 
needs the extensive consumption of the parties’ time, money, and other 
resources to reach resolution.27  Where the judge is the ultimate finder of 
fact, even cases that raise new arguments or contain onerous fact 
patterns can be addressed at the summary judgment stage. 
Although concern for preserving a litigant’s right to a jury trial has 
resulted in the current limited use and application of summary judgment, 
this is not what the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
intended.  Comments to the 1963 amendments to Rule 56 make this 
clear: 
The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings 
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 
trial. . . .  It is hoped that the amendment will contribute to the more effective 
utilization of the salutary device of summary judgment.28
Where the proceeding is otherwise destined for a bench trial and the 
record is thoroughly established, summary judgment should be viewed 
as a compelling and efficient means of decisionmaking.  As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated: 
quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (remarking that summary 
judgment “will not be granted if ‘the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if 
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury [trier of fact] could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.’ . . .  The judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. . . .  When the record could not lead 
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, 
and the motion must be granted. . . .  Any doubt over factual issues must be resolved in 
favor of the party opposing summary judgment, to whom the benefit of all presumptions 
and inferences runs.”). 
 27. See Schwarzer et al., supra note 14, at 474. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 56, advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment. 




Not every novel claim or complex case must be settled through trial, and we 
must not let the difficulty of such cases make us hostile to summary 
adjudication generally.  “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not 
as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal 
Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.’”  Moreover, where the ultimate fact 
in dispute is destined for decision by the court rather than by a jury, there is no 
reason why the court and the parties should go through the motions of a trial if 
the court will eventually end up deciding on the same record.29
Indeed, the distinction between summary judgment in a case where the 
matter would otherwise go to the jury as opposed to a case where the 
matter would otherwise be decided by a judge has been recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court.  In Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & 
Dunning, the Court stated that “[i]f this were a case involving trial by 
jury as provided in the Seventh Amendment, there would be sharper 
limitations on the use of summary judgment . . . .”30
A.  Drawing Inferences 
Once the concern for not invading the province of the jury is removed, 
the question should change from who decides, to when does the judge 
decide?  In other words, in a bench trial case, the question should be: 
Should the judge draw inferences from the facts at summary judgment or 
is a trial necessary first?  Where all evidence is in, the judge should be 
able to draw proper inferences so long as testimony is not necessary.  As 
the Eleventh Circuit stated: “To put it in another fashion, whether 
disputed issues are issues of ‘fact’ for purposes of Rule 56 depends not 
only on the state of the evidence and nature of the issue but hinges also 
on whether the litigants have a right to a jury determination.”31
1.  Drawing Inferences to Determine if Trial is Necessary 
In bench trial cases judges should draw their own inferences to 
determine at summary judgment whether a “genuine” issue exists 
requiring a trial.  As the Fifth Circuit stated, “‘the choice between 
 29. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676, 684 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) and FED. R. CIV. P. 
1).  However, despite the above quoted language the Ninth Circuit found that “the 
evidence that was before the district court [in Transworld] completely failed to 
illuminate many areas of inquiry” and therefore “did not warrant entry of summary 
judgment.”  Id. at 685. 
 30. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 622 (1973). 
 31. Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Gay, 755 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
with approval Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
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permissible inferences is for the trier of facts.’”32  To require that the 
judge at summary judgment find a genuine issue for trial based on how a 
nonexistent jury might infer the facts is nonsensical, a waste of the 
parties’ time and money, a waste of judicial resources, and certainly not 
what was intended by Rule 56. 
Indeed, the First Circuit has already found that when “the judge would 
have the task at trial of interpreting undisputed evidence . . . the calculus 
is less demanding . . . and a bench trial may be unnecessary where the 
judge has all the evidence before him on summary judgment.”33  In 
Posadas de P.R., Inc. v. Radin34 the court stated: 
We discern no reason why the trial judges should have conducted evidentiary 
hearings before determining whether the appellant merited a reduction of his 
gambling debts under the good father statute.  The appellant has pointed to no 
additional facts which he sought to present at a hearing which were not already 
in the record when the trial judges granted the motions for summary judgment.  
Nor does he demonstrate the existence of any factual dispute. . . .   Because the 
appellant has demonstrated no issue of fact to be determined at an evidentiary 
hearing and has failed to clarify how a hearing would aid in the decision of the 
equitable reduction issue, we see no error in the courts’ failure to hold such 
hearings prior to granting the appellees’ motions for summary judgment.35
It is only logical that a judge in a bench trial has discretion at the 
summary judgment stage to decide that the evidence presented, the same 
evidence that would be presented at trial, would not lead to a different 
inference if presented later rather than sooner.36
2.  Drawing Inferences in Interpreting the Facts 
Once judges determine that there are no genuine issues necessitating 
trial, judges should then draw their own inferences.  Again, this is only 
logical.  When judges determine that the record is sufficiently complete, 
this means they have just as much evidence at summary judgment as 
they would have at trial.  Furthermore, judges are the ultimate triers of 
fact in bench trial cases.  They would draw their own inferences at trial 
based on the record already before them at summary judgment; therefore 
 32. Nunez, 572 F.2d at 1124 (quoting Walker v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 270 F.2d 857, 
862 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 805 (1960)). 
 33. Wadsworth, Inc. v. Schwarz-Nin, 951 F. Supp. 314, 319 (D.P.R. 1996). 
 34. 856 F.2d 399, 400-01 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 35. Id. 
 36. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Planters Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 
1996). 




no reason to draw any other inferences at summary judgment exists.  It is 
thus appropriate for judges to draw inferences even if those inferences 
are outcome determinative.37  Just as at trial, the judge’s inferences are 
determinative, not some mythical jury’s.  In addition, at summary judgment 
it is the judge’s inferences that are determinative.  The proviso to draw 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party is only sensible and applicable 
where there is a jury, and such jury at trial might have drawn inferences 
for the nonmoving party. 
In this regard, a number of federal circuit courts have begun to endorse 
judges’ ability to draw their own inferences at summary judgment in bench 
trial cases at least where the parties do not dispute the facts, but only 
dispute what the facts mean.  For example, in Nunez the Fifth Circuit 
pointed out: 
Hearing and viewing the witnesses subject to cross-examination would not aid 
the determination if there are neither issues of credibility nor controversies with 
respect to the substance of the proposed testimony.  The judge, as trier of fact, is 
in a position to and ought to draw his inferences without resort to the expense of 
trial.38
Following the circuit’s decision in Posadas de P.R., the court in 
Wadsworth, Inc. v. Schwarz-Nin found that in the dispute regarding 
corporate fraud before it, the court could “turn the cross-motions for 
summary judgment into a ‘paper trial’ and simply determine which party 
has prevailed in persuading the court that it is entitled to judgment.”39  
The Wadsworth court made this procedural determination after finding 
that (1) “[n]either party to this case has made a proper demand for a jury 
trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), and the parties have waived any right to 
trial by jury” and (2) “[t]he issues would have been tried by the court if 
the case went to trial.”40  Likewise, in Jane L. v. Bangerter41 the court 
found the record was sufficiently complete for it to draw its own inferences 
from the facts.  In addition, district courts have found appropriate for 
summary judgment questions of intent, motive,42 and reasonableness.43
 37. CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 936 F. Supp. 880, 883 (N.D. Fla. 
1995) (citing Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Gay, 755 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985) and 
Nunez, 572 F.2d at 1124). 
 38. Nunez, 572 F.2d at 1124. 
 39. Wadsworth, Inc. v. Schwarz-Nin, 951 F. Supp. 314, 319 (D.P.R. 1996). 
 40. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b), (d)). 
 41. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992). 
 42. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Ala. 1985), aff’d, 799 F.2d 
1464 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).  It should be noted though, as 
pointed out in Phillips, that the district court does not enjoy a higher presumption of 
correctness, such as the clearly erroneous test, than the de novo standard generally applied to 
orders granting summary judgment.  A higher standard of review was proposed, discussed, 
and rejected in Phillips, as well as in Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991), and 
Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 877 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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The proposal to allow judges to draw their own inferences at summary 
judgment in bench trial cases is not radical.  Indeed, when the facts are 
not disputed, but only a question of how to draw inferences from the 
facts remains, this proposal simply allows summary judgment to 
anticipate a “trial [on] stipulated facts.”44  Of course, it goes beyond the 
mechanism of a trial on the stipulated facts by proposing that judges 
should also be able to draw their own inferences even when the facts are 
in dispute. 
B.  Making Findings of Fact 
In bench trials, when the record is sufficiently complete, judges should 
be able to make factual determinations at summary judgment.  Although, 
as discussed above, some courts have recognized that judicial efficiency 
is served and that justice is unaffected when judges exercise greater 
decisionmaking ability at summary judgment, they have limited such 
judicial ability to drawing inferences.  There is no reason for such a 
limitation.  The courts allowed judges to draw inferences at summary 
judgment because they would be the ones to draw inferences at a trial.  
Judges should likewise be able to resolve disputed facts as long as the 
record is sufficiently complete.  Although this proposal for the use of 
summary judgment might seem like a unheralded use of the Federal 
 43. In Coleman v. Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, Civ. A. No. 89-1249, 
1990 WL 27370, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 1990) (citations omitted), the court stated: 
While it is true that questions of reasonableness are rarely appropriate for 
summary judgment, this general proposition does not preclude my granting 
summary judgment in this ERISA discrimination case.  It is unquestioned that 
plaintiff’s ERISA claims are not triable to a jury.  To the extent that the court 
must draw inferences from the undisputed evidentiary facts to determine 
whether there has been prohibited discrimination, the court in a nonjury case is 
entitled to draw such inferences and conclusions on motions for summary 
judgment if a bench trial would not enhance its ability to draw those inferences 
and conclusions.  The parties have submitted numerous affidavits and other 
evidence in connection with this motion, and it does not appear that any further 
probative evidence on point would likely be presented at trial.  Based on all the 
evidence, therefore, I find that plaintiff was not constructively discharged so as 
to bring his claim within section 510 of ERISA. 
 44. United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that a 
criminal “trial can be upon stipulated facts or upon documentary evidence; no witness 
need be sworn in order to have a trial”); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Everett, 340 F.2d 65, 
70 (10th Cir. 1965) (stating that in a case “submitted to the trial court upon stipulated 
facts and documentary evidence with no oral testimony being presented,” the trial 
judge’s role is to “evaluate evidence and draw conclusions therefrom,” and the trial 
court’s findings will be set aside only if they were clearly erroneous). 




Rules of Civil Procedure, in fact, as will be discussed, it is essentially the 
same as a Rule 52 “trial on the papers.”  Rule 52 allows a judge to try a 
case on the papers without a jury and make findings of fact and 
inferences even when there are factual disputes.45  The only difference is 
that this proposal does not require the consent of the parties, as does 
Rule 52.  However, it should be noted that the parties’ consent is 
mandated for a trial on the papers also out of concern that litigants not be 
deprived of their right to a jury trial.46
The Federal Rules, and the courts’ and litigants’ interests are better 
served when a judge can weigh the evidence and make findings of fact at 
summary judgment in situations where all the relevant and material facts 
are before the judge, even when such facts are disputed. 
1.  Findings of Fact to Determine if Trial is Necessary 
In bench trial cases, judges should determine at summary judgment 
whether a “genuine” factual issue exists requiring a trial.  There is only a 
genuine need for trial where there is a dispute over fact and additional 
evidence as to those facts might exist that could affect a judge’s 
determination.  A mere dispute over the facts is not a genuine issue 
necessitating trial.  Where the record is complete, judges are in the same 
position to decide all factual issues as they would be at trial.  Therefore, 
when all evidence is in, judges should be able to resolve disputed facts 
so long as testimony is not necessary. 
It is only logical that a judge in a bench trial has discretion at the 
summary judgment stage to decide that the evidence presented is the 
same as would be presented at trial and would not lead to a different 
result if presented later rather than sooner.47
2.  Deciding the Facts 
Once judges determine that in their view there are no genuine issues 
for trial, they should resolve factual disputes.  Even when the parties do 
dispute the facts, in bench trial cases when the record is sufficiently 
complete it serves the interests of judicial efficiency to allow judges to 
weigh the evidence and make findings of fact at the summary judgment 
stage instead of waiting until trial.  When there are no additional facts 
that will be added to the record, it would be a waste of the litigants’ and 
 45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note. 
 46. See Judge Morton Denlow, Trial on the Papers: An Alternative to Cross-Motions 
for Summary Judgment, 46 FED. LAW. 30, 31 (1999). 
 47. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Planters Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
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the courts’ time and resources to postpone until tomorrow what could be 
done more immediately. 
The Eleventh Circuit has used language that apparently endorses this 
view, indicating that it is appropriate for the judge to resolve factual 
disputes at summary judgment in a nonjury case even if the facts are 
clearly contested.48  The court, in setting the stage for its own de novo 
review, reviewed a district court’s determination of disputed facts at 
summary judgment.  It left the district court’s factual determination 
untouched, implicitly allowing and endorsing it: 
The record in the present case discloses Judge Ryskamp’s acknowledgment that 
contested issues of fact might yet remain, but also evidences an eagerness to 
dispense with the case at the summary judgment stage for the same reasons 
articulated in Nunez: “I think that every facet of this case has been fully 
explored and the court has been considerably enlightened as to the details of this 
entire transaction. . . .  It is also apparent that this court would have to sit as the 
trier of fact to hear this case, and it is quite different when you hear a summary 
judgment knowing the case will go to a jury and when a case is going to be tried 
by the court.”  While the judge’s willingness to draw inferences from the facts 
was consistent with Nunez, on appeal our review will be unaffected by any 
inferential conclusions reached below.49
While the extent of the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling is not fully clear, 
parties and courts would be best served if judges were able to weigh 
evidence and make findings of fact at summary judgment instead of 
having to waste the time and money of repeating the same evidence at 
trial.  However, the linchpin of this early adjudication is the requirement 
that all the necessary facts are already in the record. 
C.  Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Judicial ability to evaluate the sufficiency of the record and weigh the 
facts to determine if a trial is necessary is in keeping with the spirit of 
Rule 56 and does not violate the rule’s ban on reaching a determination 
where there are genuine issues of material fact.50  Rule 56(c) states in 
part: 
 48. However, the appellate court would still review such inferences de novo.  
Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 49. Id. at 1573 n.14 (citing the transcript of decision). 
 50. William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 477 (1982) (“[W]here the dispute is 
solely over ultimate facts, a trial normally adds nothing in a case where the judge is the 
trier of fact.”).  It should be noted however that not all courts agree that the language of 
Rule 56 is flexible enough to allow judges to draw their own inferences at the summary 




The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.51
Likewise, Rule 56(e) states in part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.  If the adverse party does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.52
What is a genuine issue for trial under Rule 56?  This question 
requires judges to use some form of judgment.  When the ultimate trier 
of fact is a jury, it makes sense that judges find a genuine issue upon 
which a jury could potentially interpret the facts in different ways.  
When judges themselves are the ultimate triers of fact, it does not make 
sense for them to apply the potential judgment of anyone else.  In a 
nonjury case the logical question is whether in the assessment of the 
judge there is a genuine issue for trial.  There is only a genuine issue for 
trial when judges believe the record is not yet complete and additional 
facts might affect the outcome of the case.  Otherwise, judges know 
what the facts are and can resolve factual disputes at summary judgment, 
determining what inferences to draw from those facts and what legal 
consequences follow just as well as they can at trial. 
D.  Sufficiency of Record Generally a Question of Timing 
The extent of the record is the central question in determining whether 
a dispute is suitable for summary judgment in a case that would 
otherwise result in a bench trial.  When the record is sufficiently complete 
so that no material facts would be added between summary judgment 
and trial, the court is in just as good a position to determine facts at 
summary judgment as it would be at trial. 
A party might show that a dispute is not ripe for summary judgment 
by demonstrating that potential material evidence might still be 
discovered.  This, however, is not grounds for denying the motion for 
judgment level in nonjury trial cases.  At least one court has implicitly acknowledged the 
logic behind so empowering judges in nonjury trial cases but nonetheless felt the text of 
Rule 56 did not so allow.  Farmland Indus. v. Grain Bd. of Iraq, 904 F.2d 732, 738 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (“The district judge has examined virtually all the evidence it would have 
before it at a bench trial. . . .  Nevertheless, we must decide this case just as if there were 
a jury available, for the law of summary judgment does not vary with this circumstance.”). 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
GUGGENHEIM 8-8-06.DOC 8/29/2006  9:44 AM 
[VOL. 43:  319, 2006]  In Summary It Makes Sense 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 335 
 
summary judgment.  Rather, the court should stay the motion, allow 
further reasonable discovery, and then decide the motion.  Otherwise, 
summary judgment is appropriate for every bench case except when the 
credibility of affidavits or testimony requires further evaluation. 
For example, in Kennedy v. Silas the Supreme Court vacated a summary 
judgment ruling because of the complexity of the question at issue and 
its determination that the factual record was inadequate.53  The Supreme 
Court stated: 
We consider it the part of good judicial administration to withhold decision of 
the ultimate questions involved in this case until this or another record shall 
present a more solid basis of findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive 
statement of agreed facts.  While we might be able, on the present record, to 
reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be 
lacking in the thoroughness that should precede judgment of this importance 
and which it is the purpose of the judicial process to provide.54
The concern of the Supreme Court is one of timing, not an absolute 
ban on expanding the role of summary judgment.  When there is a 
concern that the record is not complete, the remedy is to stay the 
summary judgment motion pending further discovery, not to dismiss it. 
In fact, the concern that the record is not yet complete is addressed by 
Rule 56 itself.  Rule 56(f) states that summary judgment is not appropriate 
when outstanding discovery seeks information within the moving party’s 
possession or knowledge that is relevant to the issues to be resolved on 
the motion.55
To demonstrate that the record is not yet ripe for summary judgment, 
parties must affirmatively show why they require further discovery.  As 
the Eighth Circuit stated: 
Rule 56(f) is not a shield that can be raised to block a motion for summary 
judgment without even the slightest showing by the opposing party that his 
opposition is meritorious.  A party invoking its protections must do so in good 
faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant’s 
affidavits as otherwise required by Rule 56(e) and . . . rebut the movant’s 
showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.56
 53. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948). 
 54. Id.; see also Anderson v. Hodel, 899 F.2d 766, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1990); Eby v. 
Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 55. Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 740 F.2d 
423, 427 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 56. Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th 
Cir. 1975). 




The extent of the record as the central question in determining whether 
a dispute is suitable for summary judgment in a case that would 
otherwise result in a bench trial was discussed in Jane L. v. Bangerter.57  
In Jane L., the court addressed a challenge to the Utah Abortion Act on 
the ground that it violated the Constitutions of Utah and the United 
States.  The court, relying on Transworld Airlines and Nunez, determined 
that there was no need for trial.  The court found that the issues were 
properly suited for summary judgment based on the thorough record: 
   The posture of this case is that fully briefed and extensively argued motions to 
dismiss and for summary judgment were submitted for decision and taken under 
advisement.  As a prelude to those motions, the parties engaged in extensive 
discovery.  Various affidavits, deposition testimony and voluminous other 
materials were submitted in direct support of and in opposition to the pending 
motions, so that both motions in substance are presented as summary judgment 
motions.  In addition, the parties have prepared and lodged with the court 
summaries of all depositions which have been taken, as well as the depositions 
themselves, verified summaries of the testimony of persons whose depositions 
were not taken, verified statements of direct testimony of the persons who were 
deposed and all exhibits which the parties rely upon. . . .  The court has 
examined the depositions, written summaries, exhibits and other documents 
which have been submitted, and has determined that such can be and are of 
assistance in determining the legal issues presented. . . .  The court determines 
that for the most part the materials presented do not relate to controversies of 
the sort to be decided at a trial.  Rather, these are the type of materials from 
which inferences may be made by the court in arriving at legal conclusions on 
the issues presented. . . .  [A] sufficient record exists by reason of the many 
materials which have been submitted by the parties for the court to determine 
the legal issues in this case.  Accordingly, the court determines that a trial at this 
time is not necessary and that the issues presented can and should be determined 
by summary judgment.58
Despite cases such as Jane L., at least one commentator believes that 
further proceedings beyond summary judgment will almost always 
significantly “illuminate a legitimate factual dispute,” and therefore 
judges should not be able to draw their own inferences at the summary 
judgment stage.59  This author considers Professor Stempel’s concern a 
serious one, but disagrees with the premise that material facts that might 
affect the inferences to be drawn will be placed in the record after the 
summary judgment stage in most cases.60
In addition, when further material evidence may not yet have been 
presented, this possibility is likely to be known either to the nonmoving 
party or to the court.  As discussed above, any concern that the record is 
 57. 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992). 
 58. Id. at 1540-41. 
 59. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering 
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 95, 132 n.199 (1988). 
 60. Indeed, anecdotally, the opposite appears true for the majority of cases. 
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not complete will be addressed by providing further discovery prior to 
ruling on the summary judgment motion. 
The judicial system entrusts significant responsibility to trial judges 
and ensures proper exercise of that responsibility through vigilant 
appellate review.  The authority granted to a trial judge is not unduly 
expanded through a judge’s determination that the record is sufficiently 
complete and that no additional evidence that would change the 
inferences to be drawn exists.  As Judge William W. Schwarzer wrote: 
[T]he purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [is] to bring about early 
and full disclosure of trial evidence.  The summary judgment procedure 
implements that purpose by requiring the opponent to come forward with 
specific facts demonstrating that a trial is necessary.  See Advisory Committee 
Notes to Rule 56, 1963 Amendment.  To foreclose summary judgment on the 
chance that later discovery may turn up additional evidence would defeat that 
purpose.61 
E.  Additional Cases That Might Still be Suitable for Trial 
Other categories of cases exist that are suitable for trial by a judge 
despite the existence of a complete record or the possibility of 
completing the record.  These are cases that would benefit from a trial, 
notwithstanding their ability to be resolved on summary judgment.  Such 
cases might include disputes which have a great impact on the public.  
Those cases might be appropriate for trial because of the education the 
trial might provide to the populace.  Another category is extremely 
complex cases.  Regardless of how the facts may be inferred or 
inferences drawn, there are cases that can no doubt benefit from the 
parties’ opportunity to fully educate the court as to how the law should 
be applied.  For the same reason, it might be valuable to have a trial 
when there is a novel issue that will have significant precedential 
consequences.  In all of these instances the judge might in his or her 
discretion choose to have a trial despite the ability to resolve the dispute 
at summary judgment. 
 61. William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 
110 F.R.D. 213, 222 (1986).  Indeed, Judge Schwarzer is also of the opinion that in 
nonjury cases, “when all material facts are before the court on motion and the argument 
of the parties is not over what the evidence is but over its application to issues of 
ultimate fact, the judge may conclude that a trial is not necessary for a decision.”  Id. at 
228. 




As the Ninth Circuit stated: 
[J]ust as the procedural shortcut must not be disfavored, courts must not rush to 
dispose summarily of cases—especially novel, complex, or otherwise difficult 
cases of public importance—unless it is clear that more complete factual 
development could not possibly alter the outcome and that the credibility of the 
witnesses’ statements or testimony is not at issue.62
V.  THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS:                                         
A BENCH TRIAL COURT 
The United States Court of Federal Claims is a perfect forum to 
institute an expanded judicial role at summary judgment.  The Court of 
Federal Claims was created pursuant to Article I of the Constitution of 
the United States.63  It consists of judges nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate for a term of fifteen years.64  The jurisdiction of 
the court is not geographically limited, and the judges may conduct a 
trial anywhere in the United States.65  The principal statute governing the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is the Tucker Act.66  Under 
the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over 
monetary suits against the United States that do not sound in tort and 
that are founded upon either: (1) the Constitution; (2) an act of Congress; 
(3) an Executive order; (4) a regulation of an executive department; or 
(5) any express or implied-in-fact contract with the United States.67  The 
greater part of litigation brought in the Court of Federal Claims involves 
government contracts, tax refunds, federal takings, federal employees’ 
pay, Native American claims, patents, and copyrights.68
The United States Court of Federal Claims is an excellent arena in 
which to implement the expanded judicial role at summary judgment 
discussed above because it has no jury trials; the judge is the ultimate 
finder of fact in all of its cases.69  Therefore, for the reasons discussed 
above, when the record is sufficiently complete, Court of Federal Claims 
judges should determine if a genuine issue necessitating trial is present, 
 62. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676, 684-85 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2000). 
 64. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171(a), 172(a) (2000). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 2505 (2000). 
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). 
 67. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS, A DESKBOOK FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 3-79 (4th ed. 1998). 
 68. Id. 
 69. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 54, 61-62 (1997) (permitting 
government to invoke statute to compel adjudication of contingent claims did not deprive 
purchasers of Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); see also United States v. Rush, 
804 F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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and if not, make inferences as well as factual and legal determinations at 
summary judgment even when the facts are contested. 
A.  Drawing Inferences 
Despite the wisdom of allowing Court of Federal Claims judges to 
draw inferences at summary judgment, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reviews decisions of the Court of 
Federal Claims, has generally followed the historical interpretation of 
Rule 56.  Nonetheless, at least one decision of the Federal Circuit seems 
to grant greater authority to Court of Federal Claims judges at the 
summary judgment stage, and it is an en banc decision.  In Preseault v. 
United States,70 the Federal Circuit allowed a Court of Federal Claims 
judge to draw his own inferences on summary judgment when the record 
was complete, but only if there was no dispute as to the underlying 
facts.71
In Preseault, the Federal Circuit, en banc, ruled that the parties’ 
dispute over whether an easement granted to a railroad had been 
abandoned did not preclude resolution of that issue on summary 
judgment even though under state law the question of abandonment was 
one of fact.72  The court found that the underlying facts regarding the 
question were undisputed and that the Court of Federal Claims could find 
abandonment based on inferences it drew from historical events: 
The underlying facts regarding this question are undisputed.  As noted, Vermont 
denominates the question of abandonment as one of fact.  The parties are in 
dispute over whether an abandonment occurred.  Does this preclude summary 
judgment?  We think not.  Abandonment, though a fact question under Vermont 
law, is a factual conclusion based on inferences to be drawn from the 
undisputed evidence regarding the historical events.  Nothing would be gained 
by requiring a further proceeding at the trial level, since the parties had full 
opportunity to establish all relevant underlying facts.  Trial would not enhance 
the court’s ability to draw factual inferences and conclusions.  Nor, since this is 
a nonjury matter, does permitting the trial judge to rule on summary judgment 
have the effect of denying a party the right to have the issue decided by 
jury. . . .  Obviously, if there is a genuine dispute over a material evidentiary 
fact, summary judgment is precluded.73
 70. 100 F.3d 1525 (1996). 
 71. Id. at 1546. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 




Despite Preseault, the majority of Federal Circuit decisions require 
Court of Federal Claims judges to draw inferences against the moving 
party when interpreting facts.74
B.  Making Findings of Fact 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Jay v. Secretary of Department of 
Health and Human Services, is also particularly noteworthy.75  In Jay, 
the Federal Circuit reviewed the Court of Federal Claims’ decision to 
sustain a dismissal of a Vaccine Act case by a special master made on 
summary judgment.76  Under the national Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program special masters conduct nonjury proceedings to determine 
entitlement to compensation.77  A substantial amount of procedural 
authority is granted to the special master.78  Despite this procedural 
authority and the fact that there are no jury cases before Vaccine Act 
special masters, the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of Federal 
Claims.79  The Federal Circuit ruled that the Vaccine Act required the 
special master in Jay to make factual findings in order to make a 
determination.80  According to the Federal Circuit, factual determinations 
could not be made by a special master at the summary judgment stage.81
The Federal Circuit stated that it is inappropriate for a special master 
to weigh evidence or draw inferences at the summary judgment stage.  
Its ruling also applies to the Court of Federal Claims.  The Federal 
Circuit stated that Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Claims 
 74. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, No. 99-5082, 1999 WL 1021054, *2 (Fed. 
Cir. Nov. 5, 1999) (remarking that on an appeal from the Court of Federal Claims, the 
Federal Circuit, “give[s] plenary review to the grant of summary judgment . . . resolving 
any disputed material fact and drawing factual inferences in favor of the non-movant.”) 
(citation omitted); Am. Broad. Co.s v. United States, 129 F.3d 1243, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“On appeal [from the Court of Federal Claims], we review a grant of summary 
judgment . . . de novo, with justifiable inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party.”); Lane Bryant, Inc. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Upon 
review of a grant of summary judgment [by the Court of Federal Claims], all evidence is 
to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.  Summary judgment is 
properly granted when no material facts are in dispute and the prevailing party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.”).  But, compare to Dairyland Power Cooperative v. 
United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994), which only requires Court of Federal 
Claims judges to draw inferences that are “reasonable” in favor of the nonmoving party.  
This discretionary word “reasonable” invests the judge with at least some ability to 
weigh the possible inferences of facts. 
 75. 998 F.2d 979 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 76. Id. at 980. 
 77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–300aa-12. 
 78. CL. CT. R. 8(a). 
 79. Jay, 998 F.2d at 980. 
 80. Id. at 982-83. 
 81. Id. 
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Court (an earlier name of the Court of Federal Claims) (RUSCC) does 
not explicitly prohibit factfinding.  However, it is not clear whether the 
Federal Circuit meant this is an implicit or court-added prohibition; or 
whether it is not prohibited.  It should also be noted that the Federal 
Circuit reached its conclusion despite the fact that the authority it 
specifically quoted declared it was protecting a litigant’s right to trial: 
 
When ruling on summary judgment, “[c]redibility determinations, the 
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the 
facts are . . . not those of a judge. . . .  The evidence of the nonmovant is to be 
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”  The 
summary judgment inquiry in essence is whether the evidence presents a 
sufficient disagreement of fact to require submission to the factfinder or 
whether it is “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”  
Because summary judgment raises only questions of law, our review of the 
grant and denial in this case of summary judgment is de novo. . . .  The Claims 
Court’s authorization of factfinding on summary judgment however is 
imprudent and illogical: either a case is decided by summary judgment or it is 
not.  If the statute precludes the special master from making a determination 
without making factual findings, then the statute precludes summary judgment. . . .   
    Contrary to the assertion of HHS, the Vaccine Rules do not authorize 
factfinding on summary judgment.  Vaccine Rule 8(d) permits the special 
master to decide a case on summary judgment, “adopting procedures set forth 
in RUSCC 56 modified to the needs of the case.”  HHS argues that the Vaccine 
Rules permit the special master to “modify” summary judgment to dispense 
with waiting until the end of the case to find the facts.  This is incorrect.  
Vaccine Rule 8(d) allows the “procedures set forth” in RUSCC 56 to be 
modified.  RUSCC 56 sets forth various procedures, but does not mention the  
prohibition on factfinding.  Vaccine Rule 8(d) therefore cannot be read to 
authorize factfinding on summary judgment.  To allow a special master to 
weigh and find facts prior to the end of the case (effectively at an arbitrary 
point in the litigation dictated by the summary judgment movant) would raise 
serious due process concerns.82
C.  Expanding the Role of Summary Judgment in the                              
United States Court of Federal Claims 
Jay, Lane Bryant, American Broadcasting, and Brown should not be 
the end of the debate, but only the beginning.  The Federal Circuit has 
not been confronted with the logic discussed above and endorsed in 
Transworld Airlines, Nunez, Coats & Clark, and Posadas.  A test case 
might persuade the Federal Circuit to allow Court of Federal Claims 
judges to determine if genuine issues exist that necessitate trial, and if 
 82. Id. at 982-83 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 
55 (1986)) (emphasis added and other citations omitted). 




not, weigh the evidence, draw inferences, and make factual determinations 
at summary judgment. 
Over the past decade, a number of Court of Federal Claims decisions 
have cautiously entered the debate.  In Dzuris v. United States, the court 
highlighted the lack of sense in requiring a judge to draw inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party in a bench trial case.83  The court first 
noted that the “summary judgment ‘standard mirrors the standard for a 
directed verdict’” in certain circumstances.84  The court next noted that 
the judge is therefore to decide whether “the trier of fact” could 
reasonably find for the nonmoving party at trial, and explicitly cited jury 
trial language.85  The wording and citation of Dzuris again spotlight the 
lack of efficiency in requiring judges to draw inferences for nonmoving 
parties simply to allow judges to draw their own conclusions at a 
subsequent trial on the same facts: 
    When resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court may neither make 
credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence and seek to determine the truth of 
the matter.  Although entitled to “all applicable presumptions, inferences, and 
intendments,” the non-movant bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence 
upon which the trier of fact reasonably could find in its favor.  Should the non-
movant fail to present such evidence, summary judgment may be granted in favor of 
the moving party.  Moreover, the summary judgment “standard mirrors the 
standard for a directed verdict . . . , which is that the trial judge must direct a 
verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as 
to the verdict.”86
Another Court of Federal Claims decision that marks a significant step 
in expanding summary judgment power is Chevy Chase Land Co. of 
Montgomery County v. United States.87  The court in Chevy Chase granted 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a Rails-to-Trails Act 
case.88  Although the court did not speak to a judge’s ability to weigh 
evidence or draw inferences, the court did note that where further 
proceedings would not serve any purpose, summary judgment is 
appropriate.89  The court went so far as to say additional proceedings 
would not be useful even when there might be additional facts not yet 
presented, as long as the additional evidence is not likely to affect the 
 83. 44 Fed. Cl. 452, 456 (1999), aff’d, 232 F.3d 911, No. 99-5162, 2000 WL 
366293 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2000) (cited in table of decisions in 232 F.3d but not reported). 
 84. Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 
 85. Id. at 456. 
 86. Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52) (“In essence, . . . the inquiry 
under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of 
law.”). 
 87. 37 Fed. Cl. 545 (1997). 
 88. Id. at 599. 
 89. Id. at 562. 
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determination: “Moreover, summary judgment will be appropriate when 
the material facts are adequately developed in the motion papers, such 
that full trial will be useless because additional evidence could not 
reasonably be expected to change the outcome of a case.”90
Chevy Chase stops well short of expanding Court of Federal Claims 
judges’ summary judgment power.  Apparently, no Court of Federal 
Claims case has explicitly proposed the expanded judicial role advocated 
by this Article.  Nor has a Court of Federal Claims case espoused the 
reasoning of Transworld Airlines, Nunez, Coats & Clark, and Posadas 
on this point. 
The expanded role for trial judges at summary judgment advocated by 
this Article should be implemented in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims.  Court of Federal Claims judges should be allowed to weigh 
evidence, draw inferences, and make factual determinations at summary 
judgment because they would be the ones to do so at trial.  This 
reasoning applies whether the facts are uncontested or contested as long 
as the record is sufficiently complete.  The litigants’ and the courts’  
interests would be better served and an inefficiency obviated. 
D.  Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States                                              
Court of Federal Claims 
The Rules of the Court of Federal Claims suggest that definitive, 
factual, and inferential determinations might be appropriate at the 
summary judgment stage.  RUSCC Rule 56(c) mirrors Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c) and RUSCC 56(e) mirrors Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e).91  The logic discussed above is also mirrored.  In 
general, the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims are patterned on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Therefore, precedent under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is relevant to interpreting the Rules of 
the Court of Federal Claims, including RUSCC 56.92  Indeed, the 
argument that judicial discretion in inference drawing is allowed in 
 90. Id. 
 91. CL. CT. R. 1 states in part: 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.  The Federal Rules applicable to civil 
actions tried by the court sitting without a jury and in effect December 1, 1991, 
have been incorporated in these rules to the extent that they appropriately can 
be applied to proceedings in this court. 
 92. Jay v. Sec’y of DHHS, 998 F.2d 979, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Imperial Van Lines 
Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 634, 637 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lichtefeld-Massaro, Inc. 
v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 67, 70 (1989). 




summary judgment is even greater under the RUSCC.  The RUSCC 
adds the following language to Rule 56 not found in the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure: 
In determining any motion for summary judgment the court will, absent 
persuasive reason to the contrary, deem the material facts claimed and 
adequately supported by the moving party to be established, except to the extent 
that such material facts are included in the Statement of Genuine Issues and are 
controverted by affidavit or other written or oral evidence.93
The language “to the extent that such material facts are . . . controverted 
by . . . evidence” requires the judge to determine whether the evidence 
presented by the nonmoving party does actually controvert the material 
facts asserted by the moving party.  In making this determination it 
would be inane for a judge to draw all inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving part as a jury might do because there are no jury trials in the 
Court of Federal Claims.  Common sense requires judges to draw the 
inferences as they would otherwise draw them at trial because they are 
the ultimate factfinders. 
VI.  TRIAL ON THE PAPERS UNDER RULE 52 AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
In the event a federal circuit does not adopt the position advocated by 
this Article and its understanding of Rule 56, greater use of Rule 52 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as mirrored by Rule 52 of the 
Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, might allow an equally efficient 
adjudication. 
Rule 52, sometimes referred to as a “trial on the papers,” allows the 
court to draw inferences, apply the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, and decide the case.94  A trial on the papers is conducted by the 
consent of the parties where the papers contain all the necessary 
materials for a decision on the merits.95  If Rule 56 is not interpreted by a 
circuit as recommended above, a judge in a nonjury case should strongly 
encourage the parties to invoke a Rule 52 determination and file the 
necessary briefs and exhibits.  When this is done, the court evaluates the 
papers, makes a determination, and enters findings and conclusions.96
 93. CL. CT. R. 56(d). 
 94. Denlow, supra note 46, at 31. 
 95. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Nielsen v. W. Elec. Co., 603 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1979); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
14, § 2720. 
 96. Rule 52 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims is almost 
identical to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: 
(a) Effect.  In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in 
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The parties might be encouraged to pursue a Rule 52 resolution in an 
initial special procedures order sent to the parties in the beginning of 
the adjudication process.  The judge may point out that a Rule 52 
proceeding allows the court and the parties to focus their energies on a 
process that will judiciously and relatively quickly decide the case even 
when a question of fact is present.  The court should note that a trial on 
the papers is less expensive because it does not require nor allow 
witnesses to be prepared and presented.  The court can also inform the 
parties that a Rule 52 trial on the papers is less likely to be appealed 
because a deferential standard of review is applied.  Trials on the papers 
enjoy a “clearly erroneous” standard of review on appeal.97
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was created as a tool for expedient and just 
litigation resolution.  Because of concern for a litigant’s right to a jury 
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action.  Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review.  
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.  The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court.  It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court.  Findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion 
except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule. 
(b) Amendment.  On a party’s motion filed no later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings—or make additional 
findings—and may amend the judgment accordingly.  The motion may accompany 
a motion for a new trial under Rule 59.  When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried without a jury, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
findings may be later questioned whether or not in the district court the party 
raising the question objected to the findings, moved to amend them, or moved 
for partial findings. 
(c) Judgment on Partial Findings.  If during a trial without a jury a party has 
been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that issue, 
the court may enter judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect 
to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or 
defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline to 
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.  Such a judgment shall 
be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by 
subdivision (a) of this rule. 
 97. Acuff-Rose, 155 F.3d at 144; Nielsen, 603 F.2d at 743. 
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trial, the effectiveness of summary judgment has not been fully realized.  
This is particularly true in nonjury trials.  Specifically, trial judges at 
summary judgment have not been able to make determinations requiring 
findings of fact or to draw inferences against the nonmoving party.  
When judges are the ultimate finders of fact and the record is sufficiently 
complete, this barrier requires an unnecessary trial, and the delay and 
expenditures that go with it, so that judges can simply do what they 
otherwise might have done at summary judgment.  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not require this inefficiency and indeed implicitly 
advocate against it.  Realizing the unnecessary inefficiency that otherwise 
results, a number of circuits have begun to expand the scope of summary 
judgment when the judge is the ultimate fact finder.  These decisions, 
and their logic, are applicable to all nonjury cases and should be built 
and expanded upon. 
In bench trial cases at summary judgment the judge should first 
determine if there is a genuine issue requiring trial.  Because the judge is 
the ultimate finder of fact, there is only a genuine issue where the judge 
finds the record is not complete.  Otherwise, the judge faces the same 
information at summary judgment as at trial and there is therefore no 
genuine need for a trial.  After determining there is no genuine issue, the 
judge should weigh the evidence, draw inferences, make factual 
determinations, apply the law, and make a decision. 
Where the judge is the ultimate trier of fact, it does not make sense to 
apply the possible judgment of anyone else.  In a bench trial case where 
the record is sufficiently thorough, it is only sensible for the judge to 
draw inferences from the facts as the judge would otherwise draw them 
at trial. 
Alternatively, trial courts should institute and encourage frequent use 
of Rule 52 “trials on the paper.”  A trial on the papers is conducted by 
the consent of the parties where the papers contain all the necessary 
materials for a decision on the merits, and allows the court to draw 
inferences, apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, and decide 
the case. 
The federal rules should be applied as efficiently and effectively as 
possible.  When the record is sufficient in nonjury disputes, judges 
should be able to draw their own inferences, resolve factual disputes, 
and decide cases at the summary judgment stage.  To do otherwise is 
nonsensical, a waste of the parties’ time and money, and a waste of 
judicial resources. 
 
 
 
